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Abstract—In the current IaaS cloud market, to achieve
proﬁt maximization, multiple cloud providers compete non-
cooperatively by offering diverse price rates. At the same time,
tenant consumers judiciously adjust demands accordingly, which
in turn affects cloud resource prices. In this paper, we tackle
this fundamental but daunting cloud price competition problem
with Bertrand game modeling, and propose a dynamic game to
achieve Nash equilibrium in a distributed manner. Speciﬁcally,
we realistically consider spot electricity prices under a smart
grid environment, and systematically investigate the impact of
different system parameters such as network delay, renewable
availability, and cloud resource substitutability. We also perform
stability analysis to investigate the convergence of the proposed
dynamic game to Nash equilibrium. Cooperation among cloud
providers can achieve aggregate cloud proﬁt maximization, but is
subject to strategic manipulations. We then propose our Striker
strategy to stimulate cooperation, the efﬁciency of which is val-
idated by repeated game analysis. Our evaluation is augmented
with realistic electricity prices in the spot energy market, and
reveals insightful observations for both theoretic analysis and
practical pricing scheme design.
Keywords—Cloud computing, competitive resource pricing,
resource allocation, game theory, dynamic game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has fundamentally transformed the way
of business operations in many industries. In particular, the
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) view is adopted by large
companies such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft [1]–[3] to
deploy Internet-scale data centers where Internet users, small
startups, and even large service providers (e.g., Hulu) can
host their applications by dynamically renting computing and
storage resources as tenant consumers [4]–[7]. Speciﬁcally,
cloud providers offer cloud resources such as CPU, memory,
and bandwidth as sellers. Tenants as buyers dynamically ac-
cess cloud resources in bundles of virtual instances. Currently,
serveral large cloud facilities such as Amazon EC2 [1], Google
App Engine [2], and Microsoft Azure [3] dominate the entire
market. Therefore, in such an oligopoly cloud market, the few
cloud providers as oligopolists compete strategically in terms
of offered price rates, to achieve their own proﬁt maximization.
Instance prices intrinsically dictate resource allocation in
IaaS clouds. Cloud price competition, largely unexplored,
fundamentally determines instance price dynamics, which in
turn affects tenant demand variations. Such tenant demand
variations further inﬂuence pricing strategies of all cloud
providers. In cloud pricing scheme design, cloud providers
should consider not only proﬁt maximization, but also optimal
tenant demand responses. Therefore, a study of cloud price
competition is challenging but helps to better understand the
sustainable proﬁtability of the cloud business. To further ag-
gravate the problem, in a smart grid environment, temporal and
spatial variations of electricity prices expose cloud providers
to the risk of operational cost ﬂuctuations.
In this paper, we tackle the problem of competitive
cloud resource pricing by proposing a non-cooperative game
to tractably investigate the price competition among cloud
providers and its impact on cloud proﬁt, tenant surplus, and
instance prices. Under the practical scenario in which prices
of different cloud providers are observable, the Bertrand game
model for price competition is used to analyze and derive the
equilibrium prices for a cloud market consisting of multiple
cloud providers. To the best of our knowledge, we are among
the ﬁrst to study competitive cloud resource pricing. Speciﬁ-
cally, our contributions are three-fold.
Firstly, we build a general model to realistically capture
cloud resource pricing scheme design (Section II). Tenants
make optimal demand response decisions to maximize their
surplus (i.e., tenant utility minus dollar cost), given experi-
enced service qualities and instance prices. Bearing tenant
optimal demands and instance prices of the other cloud
providers, one cloud provider optimizes its pricing decisions
for proﬁt maximization. Rigorous equilibrium analysis is
provided, together with a dynamic game based on bounded
rationality for cloud providers to achieve equilibrium prices
in a distributed manner using local information only. Stability
analysis is performed to investigate the convergence of the
dynamic game.
Secondly, cloud providers can achieve higher proﬁts than
their equilibrium proﬁts via cooperation, and attain aggregate
proﬁt maximization at the same time (Section III). This is
credible in that only few cloud providers exist and compete
in an oligopoly cloud market. However, in a one-shot static
game, all the cloud providers adopt Nash equilibrium prices
due to strategic interactions. Therefore, we model strategic
cloud pricing as a repeated game, based on which we propose
our Striker strategy for coercing cloud providers to cooperate
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in instance pricing. The key idea of the Striker strategy is to
provide enough threats to selﬁsh cloud providers and thwart
them from deviating from cooperation.
Thirdly, we conduct extensive performance evaluation to
validate our analytical model and obtain insightful observa-
tions (Section IV). Our evaluation is augmented with realistic
electricity prices in spot energy markets. We systematically
investigate the impact of network delay, resource substitutabil-
ity, and electricity prices on equilibrium prices. For instance,
a negative correlation exists between instance prices and
resource substitutability. It is validated that the dynamic game
converges to Nash equilibrium, and that there is a tradeoff
between cloud proﬁt and tenant surplus. We have also obtained
conditions of effective threatening for our Striker strategy.
II. CLOUD RESOURCE PRICING COMPETITION AND
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we build a game theoretic model for com-
petitive cloud resource pricing. We ﬁrst discuss tenant surplus
and optimal demand response, followed proﬁt analysis of
cloud providers. Bertrand game is proposed to model cloud
price competition, and dynamic game is used to achieve Nash
equilibrium in a distributed manner.
A. Tenant Surplus and Optimal Demand Responses
To quantify payoffs obtained from resource consumption,
tenant utility explicitly considers demand responses and the
experienced service qualities. The service quality is dependent
on both network delay (i.e., transmission delay due to request
routing) and queueing delay (i.e., delay incurred by waiting for
cloud service). Due to the illusion of inﬁnite capacity in cloud
computing, we assume no queueing delay in our analysis.
Denote by N the number of cloud providers in the cloud
market. Cloud provider i sells cloud resources at price rate
pi per virtual instance. Denote by di the demand from cloud
provider i. Then, d = {d1, · · · , di, · · · , dN} is the vector
of demands from all cloud providers. Denote by γi the in-
curred network delay due to resource consumption from cloud
provider i. Γ represents the maximum experienced network
delay. Then, the payoff of unit virtual instance can be modeled
as:
bi = K · ln (1 + (Γ− γi)) , (1)
where K is a constant. Recall that pi is the price offered by
cloud provider i. Then, we deﬁne the tenant i’s surplus as the
following commonly adopted quadratic function:
U(d) =
N∑
i=1
di ·bi− 1
2
·
⎛
⎝ N∑
i=1
d2i + 2μ ·
∑
i=j
di · dj
⎞
⎠− N∑
i=1
di ·pi
(2)
Our model considers resource substitutability through pa-
rameter μ ∈ [−1.0, 1.0]. When μ = 1.0, the tenant user
can freely switch among multiple cloud resource providers
for virtual instance reservation. The function is concave, and
thus reﬂects the law of diminishing return, with the saturation
of user satisfaction as the amount of resource reservation
increases. We also consider the service quality of different
cloud providers via parameter bi.
THEOREM 1. The optimal demand response of tenant i is
given by:
Di(p) =
(bi − pi) (μ (N − 1) + 1)− μ
∑N
j=1 (bj − pj)
(1− μ) (μ (N − 1) + 1) ,
(3)
where p = {p1, · · · , pi, · · · , pN} is the vector of prices
offered by all the cloud providers.
Proof. To derive the optimal demand of the tenant user at cloud
provider i, we differentiate U(b) with respect to the demand
level di:
∂U(b)
∂di
= bi − di − μ
∑
j =i
dj − pi = 0. (4)
By solving the above equations, we can obtain the optimal
demand response.
B. Proﬁt of Cloud Providers
The proﬁt of cloud providers is the revenue collected from
tenants minus the operating cost. We can easily get the revenue
from the sale of cloud resources:
Ri = pi · di. (5)
To obtain operating cost, we consider energy cost, which
constitutes the majority of the operating cost. We consider
both electricity draw from the utility grid, and available renew-
ables. The electricity price Pri has both temporal and spatial
variations under a smart grid environment. The renewable
availability for cloud provider is r, which is in the units of
the number of virtual instances that can be powered. Denote
by Ei renewable prices at cloud provider i. Then, we obtain
the energy cost as expressed below:
Ci = Pri · (di − r)+ + Ei ·min(r, di), (6)
where (x)+ = max(x, 0).
Therefore, cloud provider i’s proﬁt is given by
Pi(p) = Ri − Ci
= pi · di + Pri · (di − r)+ + Ei ·min(r, di).
(7)
In practice, the aggregate tenant consumption is no smaller
than renewable provision. That is, cloud providers have to
procure energy from the electricity market. Then, we have
Pi(p) = Ri − Ci
= pi · di − Pri · (di − r)− Ei · r.
(8)
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C. Bertrand Game Model
Based on the above analysis, we use a Bertrand game to
model competitive pricing. The players in this game are cloud
providers. The strategy of each player (i.e., cloud provider
i) is the price per virtual instance. The payoff of each cloud
provider i is the proﬁt earned from the sale of cloud resources.
The solution concept is Nash equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium of a game is a solution that no
player can increase his own payoff by unilaterally choosing
a different strategy. The Nash equilibrium can be obtained by
using the best response function, which is the optimal strategy
of one player given the others’ strategy choices. That is, the
best response function of cloud provider i can be formulated
as:
BRi(p−i) = argmax
pi
Pi(p), (9)
where p = p−i ∪{pi} and p−i is the set of prices offered by
cloud providers other than i.
Denote by p∗ = {p∗1, · · · , p∗i , · · · , p∗N} the Nash equilib-
rium of the pricing game. Then, we have:
p∗i = BRi(p
∗
−i), ∀i (10)
where p∗−i denotes the set of best responses for all the cloud
providers other than i. To this end, we can obtain the Nash
equilibrium by solving the following equation array:
∂Pi(p)
∂pi
= 0. (11)
By deﬁnition of cloud proﬁt, the marginal proﬁt function is:
∂Pi(p)
∂pi
= Di(p) + (pi − Pri) · ∂Di(p)
∂pi
. (12)
From optimal demand response given by Equation 3, we get:
∂Di(p)
∂pi
= − μ(N − 2) + 1
(1− μ) (μ(N − 1) + 1) . (13)
The solution p∗ of equations given by ∂Pi(p)∂pi = 0 is a Nash
equilibrium. In practice, the cloud providers set prices using
the Nash equilibrium, and the optimal demand response of the
tenant user can be obtained from the demand function Di(p∗).
THEOREM 2. The Nash equilibrium solution p∗ is given
by
p∗i =
Y ·Q−X · bi + Z · Pri
Z −X , (14)
where X = 11−μ , Y =
μ
(1−μ)(μ(N−1)+1) , Z =
− μ(N−2)+1(1−μ)(μ(N−1)+1) , and Q =
Z
∑N
j=1(bj−Prj)
Z+Y N−X .
Proof. From Equation 3, we get:
Di(p) =
bi − pi
1− μ −
μ
(1− μ) (μ(N − 1) + 1) ·
N∑
j=1
(bj − pj)
= X(bi − pi)− Y
N∑
j=1
(bj − pj), (15)
where X = 11−μ and Y =
μ
(1−μ)(μ(N−1)+1) .
Substitute the above into Equation 11 and Equation 12. We
have
∂Pi(p)
∂pi
= X(bi− pi)−Y
N∑
j=1
(bj − pj)+Z(pi−Pri), (16)
where Z = ∂Di(p)∂pi = −
μ(N−2)+1
(1−μ)(μ(N−1)+1) . Then, we get:
N∑
i=1
∂Pi(p)
∂pi
= (X − Y N − Z)
N∑
j=1
(bj − pj)
+Z
N∑
j=1
(bj − Prj)
= 0. (17)
Then, we have
N∑
j=1
(bj − pj) =
Z
∑N
j=1(bj − Prj)
Z + Y N −X . (18)
Substituting the above equation into Equation 16, we have
pi =
Y ·Q−X · bi + Z · Pri
Z −X , (19)
where Q =
Z
∑N
j=1(bj−Prj)
Z+Y N−X .
D. Dynamic Bertrand Game and Best Response Algorithms
To obtain the Nash equilibrium in Theorem 2, we need
complete information of all cloud providers. However, in
practice, one cloud provider may not know others’ proﬁt
information. To this end, we propose distributed learning
algorithms for dynamic price adjustments so as to gradually
achieve Nash equilibrium for competitive pricing.
Denote by pi(t) the price offered by cloud provider i at time
slot t. The price vectors p−i(t) and p(t) are deﬁned similarly.
The pricing strategies of cloud providers approach to Nash
equilibrium via iterative strategy updating. The ideal case is
that the pricing strategies of all the other cloud providers at
time t is observable by cloud provider i. Then, we have the
best response algorithm:
pi(t+ 1) = BRi(p−i(t)), ∀i. (20)
However, as discussed above, in a realistic cloud system, the
assumption of perfect information may not be substantiated.
Therefore, each cloud provider can employ only local infor-
mation and tenant demands to adapt offered prices. Intuitively,
each cloud provider should adjust its strategy in the direction
of proﬁt maximization. Then, we can derive the strategy in the
next iteration based on the price in the current iteration:
pi(t+ 1) = pi(t) + δi ·
(
∂Pi(p(t))
∂pi(t)
)
, (21)
where δi is the updating step and determines the learning rate
of the iterative algorithm. This dynamic game is based on
the concept of bounded rationality, which does not update the
strategy to the optimal one immediately but approaches to the
optimal one gradually. This is reasonable when the collected
information about the environment is not reliable or accurate
enough.
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E. Stability Analysis
Stability analysis is critical for both the dynamic learning
algorithms to ensure that the Nash equilibrium can be achieved
at the steady state. We analyze the stability of both algorithms
by considering the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the
self-mapping functions in Equation 20 and Equation 21. In
particular, the dynamic algorithm is stable if and only if the
eigenvalues λi are all inside the unit circle in the complex
plane (i.e., |λi| < 1). In our analysis, the Jacobian matrix is
calculated as follows:
J =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂p1(t+1)
∂p1(t)
∂p1(t+1)
∂p2(t)
· · · ∂p1(t+1)∂pN (t)
∂p2(t+1)
∂p1(t)
∂p2(t+1)
∂p2(t)
· · · ∂p2(t+1)∂pN (t)
...
...
...
∂pN (t+1)
∂p1(t)
∂pN (t+1)
∂p2(t)
· · · ∂pN (t+1)∂pN (t)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (22)
Denote by jmn the element at row m and column n in the
Jacobian matrix. We employ the case of two cloud providers to
perform stability analysis for clarity. The same approach can
be applied to the case of arbitrary number of cloud providers
for stability analysis.
Denote the matrix form of the dynamic game in Equation
20 by:
p(t+ 1) = F1(p(t)), (23)
and the matrix form of the dynamic game in Equation 21 by:
p(t+ 1) = F2(p(t)), (24)
where F1(·) and F2(·) are the corresponding self-mapping
functions.
For both dynamic algorithms, at the equilibrium, we have
p(t + 1) = p(t) = p, where p is the ﬁxed point. Then, we
have:
p = Fk(p), ∀k ∈ {1, 2}. (25)
In the following, we consider the two dynamic games
respectively. For clarity, we consider the special case of two
cloud providers (i.e., N = 2). From Theorem 2, we have the
Nash equilibrium:
p∗ =
(
Y ·Q−X · b1 + Z · Pr1
Z −X ,
Y ·Q−X · b2 + Z · Pr2
Z −X
)
.
(26)
Algorithm 1. First, we consider the bet response algorithm,
(i.e., that deﬁned by Equation 20). From Equation 25, we
can obtain the ﬁxed point, if any, by solving the following
equations:
pi = F1(pi), ∀i, (27)
which obviously gives the Nash equilibrium as the solution
for the ﬁxed point (i.e., p = p∗). From equations given by
16, we also have
pi(t+1) = BRi(p−i(t)) =
Y
∑
N
j =i(bj − pj) + ZPri − (X − Y )bi
Y + Z −X ,
(28)
from which, we obtain the Jacobian matrix of the algorithm:
J1 =
[
0 − YY+Z−X
− YY+Z−X 0
]
, (29)
which is a diagonal matrix and the diagonal elements are the
two eigenvalues λi = −wixi , ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. The ﬁxed point is
stable if and only if |λi| < 1. Therefore, the stability condition
is | − YY+Z−X | < 1. That is, | μ2μ(N−2)+2 | < 1, implies that
the ﬁxed point of Nash equilibrium is always stable.
Algorithm 2. Second, we consider the dynamic game requir-
ing no complete information (i.e., that deﬁned by Equation 21).
From Equation 25, we can obtain the ﬁxed point, if any, by
solving the following equations:
pi = F2(pi), ∀i, (30)
which gives
δi ·
(
∂Pi(p)
∂pi
)
= 0. (31)
Therefore, the unique ﬁxed point is also the Nash equilibrium:
p = p∗. (32)
Again, from equations given by Equation 16 and
pi(t+ 1) = pi(t) + δi · ∂Pi(p(t))
∂pi(t)
, (33)
(34)
we obtain the Jacobian matrix of the algorithm:
J2 =
[
1 + δ1(Z + Y −X) δ1Y
δ2Y 1 + δ2(Z + Y −X)
]
, (35)
which is neither diagonal nor triangular. Therefore, we derive
the eigenvalues from the characteristic equation λ2 − λ(j11 +
j22) + (j11j22 − j12j21) = 0, the roots of which are the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix:
(λ1, λ2) =
(j11 + j22)±
√
4j12j21 + (j11 − j22)2
2
= 1 +
(δ1 + δ2)(Z + Y −X)
2
±
√
4δ1δ2Y 2 + (δ1 − δ2)2(Z + Y −X)2
2
.(36)
The stability condition is again |λi| < 1. The condition
is determined by X , Y , and Z, which is independent of
electricity prices and the beneﬁt obtained by the tenant users
from the reserved resources. However, the stability condition
is highly dependent on the resource substitutability (i.e., μ)
and the updating step sizes (i.e., δi).
III. COERCION FOR AGGREGATE PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
A. Optimal Pricing for Aggregate Proﬁt Maximization
The total proﬁt for all the cloud providers is given by∑N
i=1 Pi(p). The optimal price for all the cloud providers can
therefore be obtained by solving the following problem:
max
p0
N∑
j=1
Pj(p). (37)
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The problem can be solved by solving the following linear
equations:
∂
∑N
j=1 Pj(p)
∂pi
= 0, ∀i. (38)
This gives optimal prices, different from equilibrium prices
achieved in the Bertrand game (refer to Theorem 2).
THEOREM 3. The optimal prices for cloud proﬁt maxi-
mization is given by:
p∗i =
bi + Pri
2
. (39)
Proof. From Equation 3 and Equation 8, we have
N∑
j=1
Pj(p) =
N∑
j=1
pjDj(p)−
N∑
j=1
Prj(Dj(p)− r)−
N∑
j=1
Ejr.
From Equation 15, we have
∂Dj(p)
∂pi
= Y, ∀i = j, (40)
∂Di(p)
∂pi
= Y −X, ∀i. (41)
Then, we get the marginal function of the total proﬁt:
∂
∑N
j=1 Pj(p)
∂pi
= Di(p) +
N∑
j=1
(pj − Prj) · Y
−(pi − Pri) ·X
= 0. (42)
Substituting Equation 15 into the above equation, we obtain
0 = 2X(bi − pi)−X(bi − Pri)− 2Y
N∑
j=1
(bj − pj)
+Y
N∑
j=1
(bj − Prj), ∀i. (43)
Summing up the left side and right side of the above equations,
we get
N∑
j=1
(bj − pj) =
∑N
j=1(bj − Prj)
2
. (44)
From the above two equations, we obtain
p∗i =
bi + Pri
2
. (45)
1) Non-Cooperation in a Static Game: As demonstrated
above, optimal prices for aggregate proﬁt maximization are
different from resource prices in the Nash equilibrium. There-
fore, in a static game (i.e., the game is played only once), one
or more of cloud providers can boost the experienced utility
by unilaterally deviating from the optimal prices incurred
by cooperation. Denote by C the cooperative strategy (i.e.,
adopting optimal prices for aggregate proﬁt maximization),
andD the non-cooperative strategy (i.e., adopting the deviation
prices using best response function). Denote by N the strategy
to adopt the equilibrium prices. By deﬁnition, we get the
following theorem.
THEOREM 4. There exists a unique N.E. 〈N,N〉 for the
static cloud resource pricing game.
B. Coercing Non-Cooperative Cloud Providers
In practice, the cloud resource pricing game is played
repeatedly among cloud providers. In this section, we demon-
strate the feasibility of coercion leading to cooperation in
this repeated cloud pricing game. Then, we propose a novel
Striker strategy to coerce non-cooperative cloud providers
to cooperate. The crux is to provide enough threat to non-
cooperative behaviors so as to prevent strategic deviation from
cooperation.
1) Repeated Game Modeling: We now model the repeated
aspects in the cloud pricing game. Denote by Pi(t) the
proﬁt of cloud provider i for strategy si(t) taken in time
round t. We utilize the discounted average of cloud proﬁts
obtained in different time periods to model and evaluate cloud
utilities. Thus, we can evaluate an arbitrary strategy sequence
{si(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T} by
P i =
T∑
t=0
[
Pi(t) · λit
]
. (46)
In a realistic cloud system, T denotes how long they care about
the future. The discount factor, denoted as λi (0 ≤ λi ≤ 1),
models the shadow of the future (i.e., the importance of proﬁts
obtained from subsequent moves relative the previous move).
In this paper, we adopt the inﬁnitely repeated game (i.e., T =
+∞) because all cloud providers have no idea about exactly
when the game will stop (i.e., the ending date of the cloud
business).
2) Coercion Feasibility: Before further discussions on in-
centive scheme design for coercion leading to cooperation, we
need to ﬁrst answer whether it is feasible to enforce an N.E.
in which both players are cooperative with our inﬁnite game
modeling. This is important because according to the backward
induction principle, 〈N,N〉 is also N.E. in a ﬁnitely repeated
game with the game termination time explicitly known to all
cloud providers. Fortunately, we can always enforce a strategy
path yielding players payoffs larger than the minmax payoff
in N.E. The minmax payoff is deﬁned below [8].
DEFINITION 1. The minmax payoff of player x is deﬁned
as
min
sy∈Sy
(
max
sx∈Sx
Px (sx, sy)
)
, (47)
where x ∈ {τ, i} and {y} = {τ, i} \ {x}. Here, Sx is the
strategy space of player x.
This proves the feasibility to enforce an N.E. 〈C,C〉, which
yields the proﬁt, larger than the minmax payoff. Indeed, the
minmax payoff is the proﬁt obtained in the N.E. in the static
game (i.e., 〈N,N〉).
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3) Striker Strategy: In a repeated game, the cloud providers
play the pricing game for multiple rounds, and the outcome of
the previous play is observable by other players. Consequently,
the cloud providers may adjust their actions by coordinating
with each other so as to achieve the desirable outcome.
Therefore, we propose our Striker strategy, taken by cloud
providers for coercing others to cooperation. In particular,
cloud providers apply limited punishments as threatening to
non-cooperative ones: ∀t ≥ 0, cloud providers select
1. strategy C in time round t+1, if all others adopt strategy
C in time round t;
2. strategy N in time rounds from t+1 to t+ Ti, if some
cloud providers adopt strategy N in time round t.
C. Effective Threatening
Responding to the threat, non-cooperative cloud providers
can continue the non-cooperation or switch to the choice
of cooperation. This depends on the experienced discounted
proﬁts. Intuitively, when the punishment intensity is large
enough, non-cooperative ones do not have incentives to deviate
from cooperation.
DEFINITION 2. We deﬁne a threat to be effective if non-
cooperative cloud providers switch to cooperation after the
threat.
We now derive conditions on which threatening in our
Striker strategy is effective. For cloud provider i, denote by P ci ,
P di , P
p
i the proﬁts obtained by adopting cooperation strategy
C, deviation strategyD, and punishment strategy N (i.e., Nash
equilibrium proﬁts), respectively. Denote by P˜ di the proﬁts
obtained by a cooperative cloud provider when some others
adopt strategy D.
THEOREM 5. If and only if
P di − P ci
P ci − P pi
≤
λi ·
(
1− λTii
)
1− λi , (48)
the striker strategy taken by cloud providers yields a unique
and strict N.E. 〈C,C〉.
Proof. We have three cases.
Case 1. If all the cloud providers play the game coopera-
tively and inﬁnitely, the long-term proﬁt of cloud provider i
is:
∞∑
t=0
[P ci · λti] = P ci +
λi ·
(
1− λTii
)
1− λi · P
c
i +
λTi+1i
1− λi · P
c
i . (49)
However, if cloud provider i deviates from the cooperation
in the current stage, then all the cloud providers will operate at
Nash equilibrium for Ti game plays. Then, we have the other
two cases:
Case 2. First, cloud provider i becomes cooperative after Ti
rounds. Therefore, long-term proﬁt of cloud provider i is:
P di +
Ti∑
t=1
[P pi · λti] +
∞∑
t=Ti+1
[P ci · λti]
= P di +
λi ·
(
1− λTii
)
1− λi · P
p
i +
λTi+1i
1− λi · P
c
i . (50)
Case 3. Second, cloud provider i may resist the punishment
and continue to be non-cooperative. Then, long-term proﬁt of
cloud provider i is:
∞∑
t=0
[Pi(t) ·λti] = P di +
∞∑
t=1
[P pi ·λti] = P di +
λi
1− λi ·P
p
i . (51)
To promote cooperation, the utility obtained in case 1 should
be the greatest among all three cases. The utility obtained in
case 2 is larger than that obtained in case 3 in that P ci ≥ P pi
by deﬁnition. Therefore, the sufﬁcient and necessary condition
is given by:
P ci +
λi ·
(
1− λTii
)
1− λi ·P
c
i ≥ P di +
λi ·
(
1− λTii
)
1− λi ·P
p
i , (52)
which gives the conclusion in the theorem.
Therefore, in the special case with Ti = ∞ (i.e., the trigger
strategy), the sufﬁcient and necessary condition of cooperation
among all the cloud providers is:
λi ≥ P
d
i − P ci
P di − P pi
. (53)
In other words, if and only if the above lower bound of λi is
satisﬁed, the threatening implemented by the Striker strategy
is effective.
DEFINITION 3. We deﬁne a threat to be credible if under
the triggering condition, the threat-claimer would obtain no
less utility than not carrying out the threat.
THEOREM 6. On the condition that Theorem 5 holds, the
Striker strategy is credible and will always be adopted by cloud
providers.
Due to page limit, we omit the proof which is similar to
Theorem 5.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present our evaluation results on the
proposed game model and algorithms for competitive resource
pricing.
A. Setup
We augment our evaluation with realistic electricity prices
in the spot market [9]. We consider a cloud market with two
cloud providers and one tenant user so as to obtain clear
insights into competitive cloud resource pricing. In the evalu-
ation, we ﬁrst use the average hourly prices of the electricity
markets in California and New York on February 29, 2012
(i.e., Pr1 = 26.4146$/MWh and Pr2 = 29.7846$/MWh)
so that we can observe the impact of price competition on
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Fig. 1: Spot electricity markets, Nash equilibrium, and algorithm convergence. (a) The price variation in the hourly market in
California and New York on February 29, 2012. (b) Illustration of Nash equilibrium calculated by best response functions.
(c) The convergence of the cloud providers’ prices to the Nash equilibrium in the dynamic game.
equilibrium instance prices. Then, we use the hourly electricity
price time series (as shown in Fig. 1(a)) to examine the impact
of electricity price dynamics on the spot resource prices in the
cloud market. For the cloud proﬁt model, we use α = 0.1,
r = 5, Ei = 10. For tenant surplus, we use the maximum
incurred delay L = 30000, γ1 = 5000, γ2 = 3000, μ = 0.1,
and K = 10 by default.
B. Nash Equilibrium and Convergence of the Dynamic Game
Fig. 1(b) illustrates the calculation of the Nash equilibrium
using best response functions. It is observed that higher
resource substitutability leads to lower equilibrium instance
prices due to more ﬁerce competition. Fig. 1(c) shows the
price dynamics under the dynamic game for δi = 0.8. It is
observed that the prices for both cloud providers converge
to the equilibrium levels despite the initial stage of price
ﬂuctuations. Actually, the ﬂuctuations are larger for greater
δi, and the dynamic game even never converges for sufﬁcient
large δi.
C. Price Competition among Cloud Providers
Fig. 2(a) shows the impact of network delay on equilibrium
prices. We ﬁnd that the price of cloud provider 1 is lower
due to the larger network delay, when γ2 < γ1, and vice
versa for γ2 > γ1. This shows the competitive relationship
between the two cloud providers for pricing scheme design.
That is, lower service quality of one cloud provider may
decrease its own prices but increase the resource prices of the
other one at Nash equilibrium. This reﬂects the adaptation of
the tenant’s demands to the service quality of different cloud
resource providers. Indeed, lower service quality will reduce
the tenant demand, and cloud provider 2 will lower down
the resource price so as to increase its own proﬁt at Nash
equilibrium. In Fig. 2(b), we use the same network delay for
both cloud providers (i.e., γi = 5000) so as to observe the
impact of cloud provider numbers on cloud resource prices.
It is noticed that resource prices decrease with the increase in
the number of cloud providers. This illustrates the formulation
of an oligopoly market for cloud resource sharing. Fig. 2(c)
shows the dynamics of cloud resource prices in a smart grid
environment. By comparing it with Fig. 1(a), we observe
the positive correlation between cloud resource prices and
electricity cost. This indicates the critical role of energy cost
in cloud resource pricing.
D. Tradeoff between Cloud Proﬁt and tenant Surplus
From Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b), it is observed that there is a
negative relationship between cloud proﬁt and substitutabil-
ity, but a positive relationship between tenant surplus and
substitutability. That is, the cloud proﬁt decreases, while the
tenant surplus increases with the increase of substitutability.
We observe similar relationships among cloud proﬁt, tenant
surplus, and electricity prices. This implies that there is a
fundamental tradeoff between cloud proﬁt and tenant surplus.
Moreover, compared with Nash equilibrium, the cloud proﬁt is
higher and the tenant surplus is lower under the optimal pricing
for cloud proﬁt maximization. Fig. 3(c) shows the lower
bounds of the discount factors for both cloud providers so that
the punishment in trigger strategy is effective. It is observed
that the lower bounds are higher for higher substitutability.
At the same time, the lower bounds can be readily satisﬁed
because in practice the discount factors are much larger.
V. RELATED WORK
Cloud resource pricing recently draws great attention to the
research community [10]. In a realistic cloud market, both
spot prices and usage-based prices exist for the convenience
of tenant users. Wang et al. [7] optimize cloud revenue by
dynamically partitioning the cloud capacity between the two
pricing tiers. Niu et al. [11], [12] argue the necessity of
cloud tenants to multiplex cloud resources among correlated
tenant trafﬁc. Most relevant, Xu et al. [13], [14] assume a
demand distribution and achieve cloud revenue maximization
by proposing a centralized optimization framework. Cao et al.
[15] explore cloud proﬁt maximization by building queueing
models for optimal multiserver conﬁguration. Despite the
above recent studies on cloud resource pricing, they ignore
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Fig. 2: Cloud resource prices under cloud provider competition. (a) Price variation under different cloud resource
substitutability and network delay. (b) Price variation under multiple cloud providers. (c) Price dynamics using electricity
spot prices in hourly electricity spot markets on February 29, 2012.
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Fig. 3: Cloud proﬁt, tenant surplus, and the maintenance of total proﬁt maximization. (a) Cloud proﬁt comparison under
different substitutability and electricity prices. (a) tenant surplus comparison under different substitutability and electricity
prices. (c) Minimum discount factors to maintain cooperation for total proﬁt maximization under trigger strategy.
the problem of the competitive nature among cloud providers
and its critical impact on cloud proﬁt and tenant demands.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we explore the problem of competitive cloud
resource pricing for cloud providers. Indeed, cloud providers
compete for proﬁt maximization in an oligopoly market. We
realistically model the pricing scheme of the cloud provider
by considering the impact of network delay, renewables, and
electricity prices. We propose a noncooperative game to model
such competitive resource pricing. We then conduct equilib-
rium analysis under the assumption of perfect information.
To relax the assumption of perfect information, we propose
the adoption of dynamic game to reach Nash equilibrium in a
distributed manner by using local information only. The results
revealed insightful observations for practical pricing scheme
design. In the future, we would like to extend our model to
the more general case of multiple tenant users.
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